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Abstract 
In this paper, I consider the extent to which the stagnation of household consumption is 
responsible for the decade-long recession in Japan during the 1990s and early 2000s and the 
reasons for the stagnation of household consumption during this period and find that the 
stagnation of private investment (and inventory investment) rather than that of household 
consumption was the major cause of the decade-long recession, that household consumption 
was nonetheless relatively stagnant during this decade, and that the stagnation of household 
consumption was due primarily to the stagnation of household disposable income, the decline in 
household wealth (which in turn was due primarily to the collapse of land and equity prices), 
and to a lesser extent, increased uncertainty about the future (especially about old age in general 
and public old-age pensions in particular), the deterioration of future prospects, and deflationary 
expectations concerning consumer prices.  1
1. Introduction 
Japan’s economy has been in recession more or less continuously for more than a 
decade (Japan’s so-called “Lost Decade”), and Japan’s growth rate during this period has been 
the lowest among the major industrialized countries of the world.  During the 1995-2002 
period, for example, the annual growth rate of Japan’s real GDP averaged only 1.2%, which is 
lower than all of the other G7 countries—Canada (3.4%), the United States (3.2%), the United 
Kingdom (2.7%), France (2.3%), Italy (1.8%), and Germany (1.4%)--as well as the Euro area 
average (2.2%) and less than half of all of the other larger OECD countries—Korea (5.3%), 
Australia (3.8%), Spain (3.3%), the Netherlands (2.9%), and Mexico (2.6%)--as well as the 
OECD-wide  average  (2.7%).   
In this paper, I consider the extent to which the stagnation of household consumption 
is responsible for the decade-long recession in Japan during the 1990s and early 2000s and the 
reasons for the stagnation of household consumption during this period.  The paper is 
organized as follows: section 2 considers the first issue, section 3 considers the second issue, 
and section 4 is a brief concluding section. 
To preview the main findings of this paper, I find that the stagnation of private 
investment (and inventory investment) rather than that of household consumption was the major 
cause of the decade-long recession in Japan during the 1990s and early 2000s, that household 
consumption was nonetheless relatively stagnant during this decade, and that the stagnation of 
household consumption was due primarily to the stagnation of household disposable income, 
the decline in household wealth (which in turn was due primarily to the collapse of land and 
equity prices), and to a lesser extent, increased uncertainty about the future (especially about  
old age in general and public old-age pensions in particular), the deterioration of future 
prospects, and deflationary expectations concerning consumer prices. 
My findings suggest that the best way to bring the Japanese economy out of recession 
would be to stimulate private investment in housing and plant and equipment as well as 
household consumption, and in my opinion, the best way of doing so would be to introduce 
temporary and targeted tax breaks for housing and plant and equipment investment, household  2
consumption, etc., and to reduce uncertainty about the future, especially about old age in general 
and public old-age pensions in particular. 
 
2. The Contribution of the Stagnation of Household Consumption to the Decade-Long 
Recession 
In this section, I consider the extent to which the stagnation of household consumption 
is responsible for the decade-long recession of the 1990s and early 2000s.      I first consider the 
period of analysis as a whole (1991-2002) and then divide this period into two subperiods 
(1991-1997 and 1997-2002) because GDP growth was considerably higher during the first 
subperiod than it was during the second subperiod (1.58% vs. 0.36%).     
Table 1 shows the average annual real growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) 
and the various components thereof during the 1991-2002 period as a whole, the 1991-1997 
subperiod, and the 1997-2002 subperiod, and as can be seen from this table, the average growth 
rate of GDP during these three periods was a mere 1.03%, 1.58%, and 0.36%, respectively, 
whereas the average growth rate of household consumption during the same three periods was 
1.35%, 1.94%, and 0.65%, respectively.  Thus, the average growth rate of household 
consumption was considerably higher than that of GDP in all three periods albeit not high in 
absolute terms and not nearly as high as the average growth rate of some other components of 
GDP: the growth rate of the consumption of private non-profit institutions serving households 
was 4.55%, 4.64%, and 4.44%, respectively; that of the net exports of goods and services was 
4.55%, 3.09%, and 6.32%, respectively; that of government consumption was 3.07%, 2.82%, 
and 3.38%, respectively, during the three periods considered; and those of public fixed 
investment and inventory investment were 4.00% and 2.18%, respectively, during the 1991-97 
period).    Preliminary figures show that the growth rate of household consumption fell short of 
that of GDP during all four quarters of 2003 and in the first quarter of 2004, but if this most 
recent period is ignored, the average growth rate of household consumption exceeded that of 
GDP, which implies that household consumption did not act as a drag on the economy and in 
fact raised rather than lowering the growth rate of GDP.
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What did act as a drag on the economy were private fixed investment and inventory 
investment (changes in inventories), both of which showed slower growth than GDP and in fact 
showed negative growth throughout the 1991-2002 period (with one exception): -1.19%, 
-0.96%, and –1.47%, respectively, in the case of private fixed investment, and –193.06%, 2.18%, 
and –183.19%, respectively, in the case of inventory investment during the three periods 
considered.  A breakdown of private fixed investment shows that private housing (dwelling) 
investment declined especially sharply (-2.58%, -0.72%, and –4.76%, respectively, during the 
three periods considered), which suggests that it might have been the primary culprit of the 
decade-long recession.    Preliminary figures indicate that private housing investment continued 
to decline in the first, second, and fourth quarters of 2003 but showed positive growth in the 
third quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004, indicating that it continued to act as a drag on 
the Japanese economy until very recently. 
Table 2 shows the contribution to real GDP growth of each component thereof during 
the 1991-2002, 1991-1997, and 1997-2002 periods, and as can be seen from this table, 
household consumption made by far the largest contribution to real GDP growth during the 
1991-2002 and 1991-1997 periods (70.30% and 64.95%, respectively) and the second largest 
contribution (96.70%) during the 1997-2002 period.    If the components of GDP are ranked by 
their contribution to real GDP during the 1991-2002 period as a whole, government 
consumption was in second place with a contribution of 44.60%, 24.65%, and 143.02%, 
respectively, net exports of goods and services was in third place with a contribution of 9.20%, 
3.51%, and 37.24%, respectively, government fixed investment was in fourth place with a 
contribution of 4.40%, 17.26%, and –59.00%, respectively, and the consumption of private 
non-profit institutions serving households was in fifth place with a contribution of 4.34%, 
2.58%, and 13.00%, respectively, during the three time periods considered.  Some have 
claimed that strong export growth prevented the decade-long recession from becoming even 
worse, but the contribution of net exports to real GDP growth was relatively modest and it 
ranked only third or fourth.    The contributions of private fixed investment (-25.30%, -13.82%, 
and –81.94%, respectively) and inventory investment (-7.54%, 0.86%, and –49.01%,  4
respectively) to real GDP growth were negative in all but one case during the three time periods 
considered, with the contribution of private fixed investment being especially large in absolute 
magnitude.  A breakdown of private fixed investment shows that private housing investment 
was responsible for 43.28%, 16.28%, and 65.72%, respectively, of the negative contribution of 
private fixed investment during the three time periods considered, meaning that its impact does 
not clearly dominate that of private plant and equipment investment, contrary to what I surmised 
earlier (more on this later). 
Some of the foregoing results concerning the average growth rates of each component 
of GDP and its contribution to real GDP growth are seemingly at odds with one other, but the 
differences can be explained by the shares of each component in total GDP.  For example, 
household consumption made by far the largest contribution to real GDP growth during the 
1991-2002 period as a whole as well as during the 1991-1997 subperiod and the second highest 
contribution to real GDP growth during the 1997-2002 subperiod even though, as noted earlier,   
the average growth rate of household consumption was much lower than that of some other 
components of GDP during all three periods considered simply because it is by far the largest 
component of GDP with a share of 52.6 to 54.5% (see Table 3).    Conversely, the consumption 
of private non-profit institutions serving households contributed relatively little to real GDP 
growth during all three periods considered even though it showed the first or second highest 
growth rate simply because its share of GDP is so small (0.8 to 1.2% or sixth among the seven 
components of GDP).   Similarly, the contribution of the net exports of goods and services to 
real GDP was only third or fourth highest even though its growth rate was the first or third 
highest simply because its share of GDP is so small (1.7 to 2.5% or fifth among the seven 
components of GDP).  As another example, inventory investment contributed much less 
toward holding down real GDP growth during the 1991-2002 period as a whole as well as 
during the 1997-2002 subperiod even though it declined much more sharply than private fixed 
investment during these periods simply because its share of GDP is so much smaller (-0.3 to 
0.6% or smallest among the seven components of GDP in the case of inventory investment vs. 
19.1 to 24.4% or second largest among the seven components of GDP in the case of private  5
fixed investment).  As a final example, private housing investment did not contribute more to 
holding down real GDP growth than did private plant and equipment investment (except during 
the 1997-2002 subperiod) even though its growth rate was much higher (except during the 
1991-1997 subperiod) simply because its share of GDP is so much smaller (3.5 to 5.2% in the 
case of private housing investment vs. 15.6 to 19.2% in the case of private plant and equipment 
investment). 
We turn finally to the composition of household consumption.  Data for the 
1991-2001 period are shown in Table 4 (data for 2002 are not yet available as of this writing), 
and as can be seen from this table, “communication” (13.95%) showed by far the most rapid 
growth during the 1991-2001 period (presumably because of the rapid diffusion of cell phones), 
followed by “health” (2.87%), “restaurants and hotels” (2.42%), ”housing, electricity, gas and 
water supply” (2.34%), and “recreation and culture” (2.25%), while “clothing and footwear” 
(-2.35%) and “education” (-1.32%) declined (see column (1) of Table 4).     
In terms of the contribution of each component to real household consumption growth, 
“housing, electricity, gas and water supply” made by far the largest contribution during the 
1991-2001 period (37.57%) because its growth rate was relatively high (2.34%) and because its 
share of total household consumption was by far the highest (24.10% in 2001) (see columns (2) 
and (3) of Table 4).  The overwhelming contribution of housing-related expenditures was due 
primarily to the increase in the imputed rent on owner-occupied housing (imputed services of 
owner-occupied dwellings), whose average growth rate was 2.48%, whose share of total 
household consumption was 17.07% in 2001, and whose contribution to real household 
consumption growth was 28.03%.  Imputed rent on owner-occupied housing is likely to be 
mismeasured because it is not a market transaction but rather is imputed using various 
assumptions, and I doubt that it grew as rapidly as the official figures suggest during a period 
when land prices were declining steadily.  Thus, the fact that imputed rent on owner-occupied 
housing was the single largest source of growth of household consumption during the 
1991-2001 period, according to the official figures, suggests that there is considerable 
uncertainty about exactly how much consumption grew during this period.  6
“Communication” made the second largest contribution during the 1991-2001 period 
(21.29%) even though its share of total household consumption was only 3.85% in 2001 
because its growth rate was by far the highest during this period (13.95%).  “Recreation and 
culture” and “restaurants and hotels” made the third and fourth largest contributions during the 
1991-2001 period (18.14% and 11.34%, respectively) because both their growth rates as well as 
their shares of total household consumption were relatively high (2.25% and 12.05%, 
respectively, in the case of “recreation and culture” and 2.42% and 7.06%, respectively, in the 
case of “restaurants and hotels”).    By contrast, the contribution of “clothing and footwear” was 
sizably negative during the 1991-2001 period (-10.49%) because its growth rate was sizably 
negative (-2.35%) and because its share of total household consumption was moderately high 
(5.18% in 2001), and the contribution of “education” was also negative but negligible (-2.08%).   
With the exception of housing-related expenditures, necessities such as “food and 
non-alcoholic beverages,” “alcoholic beverages and tobacco,” and “clothing and footwear” were 
the most stagnant and contributed the most to the stagnation of household consumption during 
the 1991-2001 period, whereas luxuries such as “communication,” “recreation and culture,” and 
“restaurants and hotels” showed the strongest growth and contributed the most to holding up 
household consumption during this period.  Thus, somewhat surprisingly, consumption 
patterns became more affluent during the 1990s despite the stagnation of household incomes 
and wealth, suggesting that the decade-long recession was not severe enough to impoverish 
Japanese households.  However, it could be that the increasing affluence of consumption 
patterns is attributable to an increase in income and wealth disparities among Japanese 
households, and if this explanation is the correct one, it implies that the poor became even 
poorer. 
In any case, household consumption did not cause the decade-long recession in Japan 
during the 1990s and early 2000s (assuming that the growth rate of imputed rent on 
owner-occupied housing was not upward biased during this period).  In fact, household 
consumption prevented the recession from becoming even worse and was the main contributor 
to economic growth during the 1990s and early 2000s, with housing-related expenditures,  7
communication, and recreation and culture contributing the most.  The main causes of the 
recession were the sharp declines in private fixed investment and, to a lesser extent, inventory 
investment.  Note, however, that this conclusion must be regarded as tentative until a more 
rigorous analysis can be done. 
Saito (2000) does a similar analysis for the earlier postwar period and finds that 
household consumption made the largest contribution to real GDP growth during the earlier 
postwar period as well but that its contribution (and also the contribution of government 
consumption) were not as large as they were after 1991.  Thus, the role played by household 
(and government) consumption during the post-1991 period was large not only in absolute terms 
but also relative to the earlier postwar period.       
 
3. The Causes of the Stagnation of Household Consumption   
In the previous section, we found that household consumption did not cause the 
decade-long recession during the 1990s and early 2000s, but it is nonetheless true that 
household consumption was relative stagnant during this period.  In this section, we analyze 
the causes of the stagnation of household consumption during the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Economic theory predicts that household consumption will be influenced by the 
following factors, among others: 
 
(1) Household disposable income 
(2) Household wealth 
(3) Uncertainty about the future (for example, about income, employment, retirement, public 
old-age pensions, etc.) 
(4) Future prospects (for example, about income, employment, etc.) 
 
These factors may have contributed to the stagnation of household consumption 
during the 1991-2002 period if: 
  8
(1) Household disposable income had declined or been stagnant 
(2) Household wealth had declined 
(3) Uncertainty about the future had increased 
(4) Future prospects had deteriorated 
 
during this period.    We look at each of these factors in turn. 
 
(1) The Stagnation of Household Disposable Income 
The average annual real growth rate of household disposable income was only 0.50% 
during the 1991-2002 period, which is far less than the average annual real growth rate of 
household consumption during the same period (1.35%).  This suggests that the stagnation of 
household disposable income was a major cause of the stagnation of household consumption 
and that it would have caused household consumption to be even more stagnant had it not been 
for other factors operating in the opposite direction. 
  Figure 1 shows the annual real growth rates of household consumption and household 
disposable income during the 1991-2002 period, and as can be seen from this figure, the two are 
relatively close in most years (with the exception of 1996 and 2001).  The growth rate of 
household consumption far exceeded the growth rate of household disposable income in both of 
these years.  It could be that the growth rate of household consumption was considerably 
higher than the growth rate of household disposable income in 1996 because the consumption 
tax was raised from 3% to 5% on April 1, 1996, and consumers accelerated purchases of goods 
and services to take advantage of the lower consumption tax.
2 
  
(2) The Decline in Household Wealth 
Household wealth (net worth) declined during the 1991-2002 period as a whole, due 
largely to the sharp decline in land and equity prices, and the average annual real rate of decline 
of household wealth during this period was 0.84%.  Thus, it is quite possible that the 
stagnation of household consumption during this period was due at least partly to the decline in  9
household wealth (a reverse wealth effect). 
Figure 2 shows the annual real growth rates of household consumption and household 
wealth during the 1991-2002 period, and as can be seen from this figure, the two are relatively 
close in most years (with the exception of 1991-92 and 1999).  The growth rate of household 
consumption exceeded that of household wealth in 1991-92 and conversely in 1999.     
The relatively strong growth of household consumption in 1991 despite the relatively 
sharp decline in household wealth in that year can be explained by the relatively strong growth 
of household disposable income in that year.  What cannot be explained is why household 
consumption increased so much in 1992, 1996, and 2001 even though the growth rates of both 
household disposable income and household wealth were relatively low in those years (and both 
were even negative in 2001).    It thus appears that household disposable income and household 
wealth are not the only determinants of household consumption.    For this reason, I turn now to 
other possible determinants of household consumption. 
 
  (3) Increased Uncertainty about the Future 
If the stagnation of household consumption were due to increased uncertainty about 
the future, we would expect the household saving rate to have increased, but in fact it has 
declined  steadily and sharply during the 1991-2002 period (except during the 1996-98 
period)--from 15.1% in 1991 to 6.4% in 2002 in the case of the unadjusted rate and from 13.3% 
in 1991 to 5.4% in 2002 in the case of the adjusted rate, a decrease of more than 50% in both 
cases (see Table 5)!
3 
4  This suggests that the stagnation of household consumption is not due 
to increased uncertainty about the future, except possibly during the 1996-98 period, when the 
household saving rate increased from 9.9% to 11.1% in the case of the unadjusted rate and from 
8.5% to 9.6% in the case of the adjusted rate.  It is not surprising to find that the household 
saving rate showed a temporary upturn during the 1996-98 period because it is during this 
period that a spate of bankruptcies (most notably the bankruptcies of Yamaichi Securities and 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in November 1997) occurred in the financial sector.  These 
bankruptcies caused increased uncertainty not only about the health of the financial sector but  10
also about the employment situation because the bankruptcies entailed large-scale layoffs of 
workers. 
Additional verification of the importance of uncertainty about the future can be 
obtained from data on saving motives, etc., from the Public Opinion Survey on Financial Assets 
and Liabilities, conducted annually by the Central Council for Financial Services Information.  
As Table 6 shows, the proportion of respondents saving for illness and unforeseen emergencies 
has not shown a clear trend over time, and the proportion saving for peace of mind has increased 
only moderately over time, but the proportion of respondents saving for old age has increased 
sharply over time (from 50.5% in 1991 to 60.4% in 2003).  Moreover, as Table 7 shows, the 
proportion of under-60 respondents who are worried about old age has increased sharply over 
time, from 63.7% in 1992 to 87.9% in 2003, and the proportion of these respondents who are 
worried about old age because pensions and insurance are not adequate increased from 55.5% to 
72.2% over the same time period, making it the reason that increased the most in importance.  
This is not surprising because Japan’s public pension system has been periodically reformed to 
keep it solvent in the face of rapid population aging—with contribution rates being increased, 
benefit levels being reduced, and the pensionable age being increased over time.   
In a related line of research, Horioka and Watanabe (1997) and Horioka, et al. (2000) 
calculate the amount of saving for each motive and find that the retirement and precautionary 
motives are by far the most important motives for saving and that they are far more important in 
Japan than they are in the United States.  Similarly, Horioka, Murakami, and Kohara (2002) 
and Horioka, Kohara, and Murakami (2004) find that dissaving is the most common way in 
which the Japanese deal with unforeseen emergencies, which corroborates the importance of the 
precautionary motive as a motive for saving in Japan from the other side of the ledger. 
A number of studies have analyzed the importance in Japan of precautionary saving 
arising from various types of uncertainty.  For example, Ginama (1988), Ogawa (1991), Doi 
(2001), and Zhou (2003) analyze the importance of precautionary saving arising from income 
risk.  Ginama (1988), Ogawa (1991), and Zhou (2003) find that precautionary saving arising 
from income risk is relatively unimportant except at the time of the first oil crisis and except for  11
the self-employed and farmers, and Doi (2003) finds that it is of some importance in the case of 
salaried worker households but that employment risk is not important (but see also the next 
subsection).  Murata (2003a, 2003b) looks at the importance of precautionary saving arising 
from uncertainty about overall economic conditions and from uncertainty about public old-age 
pensions and finds that the former is not important but that the latter is.  Nakagawa (1999) 
analyzes the importance of different types of uncertainty on the household saving rate in Japan 
by age and income and finds that different types of uncertainties are important for different age 
and income groups: he finds that income risk is important for the low- to middle-income, that 
employment risk is important for the middle-aged and aged low-income, that uncertainty about 
public old-age pensions is important for the young, and that the risk of becoming bedridden is 
important for the aged.  Finally, Saito and Shiratsuka (2003a, 2003b) analyze the impact of 
various types of uncertainty on the household saving rate and find that uncertainty about 
employment and price deflation and, to a lesser extent, overall uncertainty and uncertainty about 
income exert upward pressure on the household saving rate.
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Thus, the available evidence is not always consistent, but it suggests that precautionary 
saving arising from income risk or employment risk has generally not been all that important 
nor has it increased over time but that precautionary saving arising from uncertainty about old 
age in general and about public old-age pensions in particular is important and has increased 
over time and hence that it may have contributed to the stagnation of household consumption 
during the 1991-2002 period.   
 
(4) The Deterioration of Future Prospects 
  In the previous subsection, we discussed the impact of increased uncertainty 
concerning the future, but a closely related factor is the deterioration of future prospects.  If 
household expectations concerning future incomes, future employment prospects, etc., 
deteriorate, this should cause them to reduce their current consumption.    In addition to looking 
at the impact of income and employment uncertainty, Doi (2001, 2003) also looks at the impact 
of the deterioration of income and employment prospects on the household saving rate in Japan  12
and finds that reduced employment prospects have had a negative and significant impact on 
Japan’s household saving rate but that the impact of reduced income prospects is marginal at 
best.  Japan’s unemployment rate has increased steadily throughout the 1990s, reaching its 
highest level ever (5.5%) in August 2002 and remaining at or near this level ever since.    Thus, 
Doi’s finding that reduced employment prospects have induced Japanese households to save 
more and consume less is not at all surprising.   
 
(5) Other Factors 
Turning finally to other factors that may have influenced the level of household 
consumption, (1) the profits of individual proprietors have been stagnant during the current 
recession, putting a damper on the consumption of individual proprietors and (2) deflationary 
expectations concerning consumer prices may have depressed household consumption because 
consumer prices have been falling since the mid-1990s (with the exception of 1997) and 
because price deflation means that the longer one waits, the cheaper one can buy a given item.  
By  contrast, (3) price deflation might actually stimulate household consumption because it 
increases the real value of household asset holdings; (4) near-zero interest rates may have 
depressed household saving and boosted household consumption to the extent that the interest 
elasticity of saving is positive, (5) the rapid aging of the population may also have boosted 
household consumption because the elderly typically finance their living expenses in large part 
by decumulating their previously accumulated savings, as a result of which their propensity to 
consume is typically higher than that of the working-age population, and (6) the introduction of a 
public long-term care insurance program in 2000 may have weakened the perceived need to save, 
thereby boosting consumption.  Thus, there are factors working in both directions, and the factors 
that exert upward pressure on household consumption have presumably prevented the stagnation of 
household consumption from becoming worse than it already was. 
 
(6) Summary 
In sum, the evidence suggests that the stagnation of household disposable income and  13
the decline in household wealth (the latter of which was due primarily to the collapse of land 
and equity prices) appear to have been the main causes of the stagnation of household 
consumption during the 1990s and early 2000s.  Increased uncertainty about the future does 
not appear to have been a major cause of the stagnation of household consumption during the 
decade as a whole, but it does appear to have been of some importance during the 1996-98 
period, and increased uncertainty about old age in general and about public old-age pensions in 
particular may have contributed to the stagnation of household consumption during the period 
as a whole.  Finally, the deterioration of future prospects and deflationary expectations 
concerning consumer prices may also have contributed to the stagnation of household 
consumption, whereas near-zero interest rates, the rapid aging of the population, and the 
introduction of a public long-term care system may have worked in the opposite direction. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I considered the extent to which the stagnation of household 
consumption is responsible for the decade-long recession in Japan during the 1990s and the 
early 2000s and the reasons for the stagnation of household consumption during this period and 
find that the stagnation of private investment (and inventory investment) rather than that of 
household consumption was the major cause of the decade-long recession, that household 
consumption was nonetheless relatively stagnant during this decade, and that the stagnation of 
household consumption was due primarily to the stagnation of household disposable income, 
the decline in household wealth (which in turn was due primarily to the collapse of land and 
equity prices), and to a lesser extent, increased uncertainty about the future (especially about old 
age in general and public old-age pensions in particular), the deterioration of future prospects, 
and deflationary expectations concerning consumer prices. 
  Turning to policy recommendations, my findings suggest that the best way to bring the 
Japanese economy out of recession would be to stimulate private investment in housing and 
plant and equipment as well as household consumption, and in my opinion, the best way of 
doing so would be to introduce temporary and targeted tax breaks for housing and plant and  14
equipment investment, household consumption, etc.    There are those who oppose tax breaks of 
any kind because Japan already has the highest government debt-to-GDP ratio of any major 
industrialized nation in the world, but I favor temporary and targeted tax breaks for the 
following reasons: (1) the Japanese economy is unlikely to recover fully without further 
stimulus, and as long as the economy does not recover, tax revenues will decline further, 
causing the government debt to increase further, (2) temporary and targeted tax breaks will 
increase the government debt far less than would more permanent and/or broad-based tax cuts, 
and (3) the tax breaks will be more effective if they are temporary because temporary tax breaks 
will induce firms and consumers to accelerate their purchases of the goods and services being 
targeted in order to take advantage of the tax breaks before they expire.  Two specific 
proposals I have are to introduce a temporary investment tax credit for investment in plant and 
equipment and to temporarily reduce or abolish the consumption tax (currently 5%).  A tax 
break for housing investment is already in place but is scheduled to be phased out so another 
option would be to extend or expand this tax break temporarily. 
My analysis suggests that an alternative way of stimulating household consumption 
would be to reduce uncertainty about the future, especially about old age in general and about 
public old-age pensions in particular--for example by fundamentally reforming the public 
old-age pension system to make it solvent as well as equitable.  A major reform of the public 
pension system is scheduled for 2004 so what better time could there be for implementing a 
fundamental reform of the public old-age pension system?  If increases in public pension 
contributions are needed to keep the system solvent, they should be collected in a way that is 
equitable to all cohorts, and that means collecting more from those who currently stand to get 
back more than they put in (namely, those born in 1962 or earlier) (see Hatta and Oguchi (1999) 
and Horioka (2001)).    The current proposal to reduce the earnings replacement rate to 50% and 
to raise the contribution rate to 18.5% will probably not be enough to make the system solvent, 
but more importantly, it does not pay any heed to the important issue of intergenerational equity.     
In 2003, there was a sharp increase not only in the proportion of people saving for old age but 
also in the proportion of people who are worried about old age because of the inadequacy of  15
pensions and insurance (see Tables 6-7).  Thus, there is an urgent need to allay people’s fears 
about public old-age pensions, and doing so will have the added benefit of stimulating 
household consumption. 
  Finally, I wish to note the limitations of my analysis.  In this paper, I have focused 
entirely on the demand side of the economy, whereas, for example, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) 
focus on the supply side.  Hayashi and Prescott (2002) find that the decade-long recession in 
Japan during the 1990s and early 2000s was due primarily to the decline in the growth rate of 
total factor productivity and to the reduction in working hours from 44 hours per week to 40 
hours per week during the 1988-93 period pursuant to the revision of the Labor Standards Law 
in 1988 and that it was not due to the breakdown of the financial system (except during the 
1996-98 period).    The decade-long recession was undoubtedly due to both demand-side factors 
and supply-side factors, and thus Hayashi and Prescott’s (2002) analysis complements the 
present paper nicely.  As for policy recommendations, Hayashi and Prescott’s (2002) findings 
imply that subsidies to inefficient firms and declining industries should be discontinued since 
they presumably lower the overall rate of productivity growth.  Such a policy would bring 
about an improvement in government finances in addition to enhancing productivity growth and 
hence would kill two birds with one stone.  I am thus all in favor of making use of 
demand-side policies and supply-side policies simultaneously. 
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Final consumption expenditure of households 1.35 1.94 0.65
Final consumption expenditure of private non-profit
institutions serving households 4.55 4.64 4.44
Government final consumption expenditure 3.07 2.82 3.38
Private gross domestic fixed capital formation -1.19 -0.96 -1.47
   Housing (-2.58) (-0.72) (-4.76)
   Plant and equipment (-0.84) (-1.02) (-0.63)
Public gross domestic fixed capital formation 0.71 4.00 -3.09
   Dwellings (-0.23) (6.19) (-7.42)
   Plant and equipment (0.16) (4.02) (-4.28)
   General government (0.91) (3.89) (-2.54)
Changes in inventories (inventory investment) -193.06 2.18 -183.19
   Private sectors (-192.66) (0.24) (-184.32)
   Public sectors (-170.10) (na) (-57.31)
Net exports of goods and services 4.55 3.09 6.32
   Exports of goods and services (3.74) (4.82) (2.45)
   Imports of goods and services (3.52) (5.25) (1.49)
Gross domestic expenditure (product) 1.03 1.58 0.36
Average Annual Real Growth Rate (percent)
Table 1: Average Annual Real Growth Rate of Each Component of GDP, 1991-2002
Note:  The average annual real growth rate of component X between year t1 and year t2 was calculated
as [(X(t2)-X(t1))**(1/(t2-t1)) - 1]*100.  "na" denotes "not available."
Source: Naikakufu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho (Economic and Social Research Institute,
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan), ed., Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nenpou (Annual Report on
National Accounts), 2004 edition (Tokyo: Dokuritsu Gyousei Houjin Kokuritsu Insatsu-kyoku




Final consumption expenditure of households 70.30 64.95 96.70
Final consumption expenditure of private non-profit
institutions serving households 4.34 2.58 13.00
Government final consumption expenditure 44.60 24.65 143.02
Private gross domestic fixed capital formation -25.30 -13.82 -81.94
   Housing (-10.95) (-2.25) (-53.85)
   Plant and equipment (-14.35) (-11.56) (-28.09)
Public gross domestic fixed capital formation 4.40 17.26 -59.00
   Dwellings (-0.05) (0.97) (-5.04)
   Plant and equipment (0.21) (3.86) (-17.77)
   General government (4.24) (12.43) (-36.19)
Changes in inventories (inventory investment) -7.54 0.86 -49.01
   Private sectors (-7.81) (0.10) (-46.83)
   Public sectors (0.27) (0.77) (-2.19)
Net exports of goods and services 9.20 3.51 37.24
   Exports of goods and services (35.54) (28.08) (72.33)
   Imports of goods and services (26.34) (24.57) (35.09)
Gross domestic expenditure (product) 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: The same as Table 1.
Contribution to Real GDP (percent)
Table 2: Contribution to Real GDP Growth of Each Component of GDP, 1991-2002
Note: The contribution of each component to real GDP growth is calculated as the ratio of the real




Final consumption expenditure of households 52.60 53.71 54.48
Final consumption expenditure of private non-profit
institutions serving households 0.82 0.98 1.19
Government final consumption expenditure 13.43 14.44 16.74
Private gross domestic fixed capital formation 24.38 20.94 19.10
   Housing (5.21) (4.54) (3.49)
   Plant and equipment (19.17) (16.40) (15.61)
Public gross domestic fixed capital formation 6.43 7.40 6.21
   Dwellings (0.22) (0.29) (0.19)
   Plant and equipment (1.43) (1.65) (1.30)
   General government (4.78) (5.47) (4.72)
Changes in inventories (inventory investment) 0.62 0.64 -0.25
   Private sectors (0.65) (0.60) (-0.25)
   Public sectors (-0.03) (0.04) (0.00)
Net exports of goods and services 1.73 1.89 2.52
   Exports of goods and services (8.49) (10.25) (11.36)
   Imports of goods and services (6.76) (8.36) (8.84)
Gross domestic expenditure (product) 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: The same as Table 1.
Share of GDP (percent)
Table 3: Composition of GDP, 1991-2002 23
 
Average Share  of Contribution
Purpose of expenditure Annual Real Household to Real Household
Growth Rate, Consumption Consumption
1991-2001 in 2001 Growth, 1991-2001
(percent) (percent) (percent)
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 0.13 14.36 1.41
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 0.46 2.95 1.00
Clothing and footwear -2.35 5.18 -10.49
Housing, electricity, gas and water supply 2.34 24.10 37.57
     Imputed service of owner-
     occupied dwellings (2.48) (17.07) (28.03)
Furnishings, household equipment and
     household services 1.46 5.04 5.14
Health 2.87 3.63 6.75
Transport 0.69 10.25 5.12
Communication 13.95 3.85 21.19
Recreation and culture 2.25 12.05 18.14
Education -1.32 1.93 -2.08
Restaurants and hotels 2.42 7.06 11.34
Miscellaneous goods and services 0.70 9.60 4.90
Domestic final consumption expenditure
     of households 1.43 100.00 100.00
Table 4: Average Annual Real Growth Rate, Share, and Contribution of Each Component of
Household Consumption Classified by Purpose of Expenditure, 1991-2001
Source: Naikakufu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho (Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet
Office, Government of Japan), ed., Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nenpou (Annual Report on National
Accounts), 2003 edition (Tokyo: Zaimushou Insatsu-kyoku (Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau), 2003).
Note: See the notes to Tables 1 and 2 for a description of the calculation method. 24
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Table 5: Trends in the Household Saving Rate, 1990-2002
Note: See footnote 3 for the difference between the unadjusted and adjusted rates.




emergencies Peace of mind Old age
1984 75.0 25.7 42.1
1985 77.2 26.4 42.5
1986 75.0 25.3 42.5
1987 76.4 26.1 46.1
1988 77.1 28.0 50.2
1989 80.5 28.7 51.5
1990 74.3 25.7 52.4
1991 73.3 23.7 50.5
1992 68.3 23.0 48.2
1993 70.9 23.5 50.1
1994 69.4 24.2 51.6
1995 71.2 25.2 52.9
1996 69.7 25.9 53.9
1997 69.1 24.9 53.2
1998 73.3 24.5 55.3
1999 71.9 27.5 56.7
2000 67.5 27.1 55.9
2001 69.4 26.2 58.6
2002 69.1 26.9 56.9
2003 73.3 25.4 60.4
Table 6: The Proportion of Respondents Saving for Each Motive, 1984-2003
Saving motive
Source: Kin'yuu Kouhou Chuuou Iinkai (The Central Council for Financial
Services Information), ed., Kakei no Kin'yuu Shisan ni kansuru Seron Chousa
(Public Opinion Survey on Household Financial Assets and Liabilities), 2003
edition (Tokyo: Kin'yuu Kouhou Chuuou Iinkai (The Central Council for Financial
Services Information), 2003). 26
 
Calendar Proportion of under-60 respondents Proportion of under-60 respondents 
Year who are worried about old age who are worried about old age because pensions and





















Table 7: The Proportion of Respondents Who Are Worried about Old Age, 1984-2003
Source: The same as Table 6.
Note: The denominator in the right-hand column is under-60 respondents who are worried about old age.
"na" denotes "not available." 27
 
Notes: The line marked “Consumption” shows the annual real growth rate of the final 
consumption expenditure of households, while the line marked “Income” shows the annual real 
growth rate of household disposable income.    Household disposable income was deflated using 
the price deflator for the final consumption expenditure of households.   
 
Source: The same as Table 1. 


























Consumption 2.82 2.52 1.32 2.69 1.75 2.43 0.92 -0.33 0.01 1.12 1.64 0.80 
Income 4.20 1.54 0.74 1.50 0.90 0.19 1.19 0.82 -0.17  -0.20  -1.35 0.87 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 28
 
Notes: The line marked “Consumption” shows the annual real growth rate of the final 
consumption expenditure of households, while the line marked “Wealth” shows the annual real 
growth rate of household wealth (net worth) during the calendar year in question.  Household 
wealth was deflated using the year-end price deflator for the final consumption expenditure of 
households, where the year-end price deflator was calculated by averaging the price deflator for 
the fourth quarter of the calendar year in question and that for the first quarter of the following 
calendar year. 
 
Source: The same as Table 1. 
 


























Consumption 2.82 2.52 1.32 2.69 1.75 2.43 0.92 -0.33 0.01 1.12 1.64 0.80 
Wealth -4.67 -6.04 -1.34 1.46 -0.44 1.35 -0.25 -1.13 4.06 -0.36 -1.40 -0.95 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 29
 
                                                  
Endnotes 
 
1 This conclusion ignores second- and higher-order effects.  For example, the stagnation of 
consumption might have induced firms to cut back on their investment spending.  I am 
indebted to Keunkwan Ryu for this point. 
 
2 The fact that the real growth rate of household consumption relative to the same quarter of the 
previous year was higher in the first quarter of 1996 than it was in subsequent quarters of 1996 
(3.3% vs. 2.5%, 1.7%, 2.3%) corroborates this hypothesis. 
 
3 The difference between the two rates is that the latter includes “social transfers in kind, 
receivable” in the denominator whereas the former does not.  “Social transfers in kind, 
receivable” are defined as the sum of “social benefits in kind” (the insurance-financed portion of 
medical and long-term care services) and “transfers of individual non-market goods and 
services” (government consumption that is attributable to individual households such as 
government-provided school textbooks). 
 
4 It is, of course, possible that households were not able to save more despite their desire to do 
so because of declining incomes and wealth. 
 
5 Saito and Shiratsuka (2003a, 2003b) distinguish between precautionary saving (which depends 
on the magnitude of risks) and saving as a waiting option (which depends on how long it takes 
for uncertainties about the future to be resolved).  They  find  that  precautionary saving has been 
more important since the 1980s but that there is some evidence of saving as a waiting option in  30
                                                                                                                                                  
the 1990s. 
 